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Abstract 
We are investigating the nature of knowledge building in virtual 
communities. In particular, we are exploring the possibility that 
a small group of students collaborating online on math problems 
can construct shared group knowledge that exceeds the 
knowledge of the individual group members. That is, can people 
working and learning as a community accomplish tasks that 
none of them would have been able to do individually? 
1. Overview of the Problem 
The term “shared knowledge” is ambiguous. It can refer to: 
• Similarity of individuals’ knowledge: The knowledge in 
the minds of the members of a group happen to overlap and 
their intersection is “shared.”  
• Knowledge that gets shared: Some individuals 
communicate what they already knew to the others. 
• Group knowledge: Knowledge is interactively achieved in 
discourse and may not be attributable as originating from 
any particular individual. 
Collaboration theory argues that “common ground” – a form of 
shared knowledge – is required for successful communication. 
But it is not always clear whether repairs to breakdowns in such 
common ground comes from ideas that existed in someone’s 
head and are then passed on to others until a consensus is 
established, or whether the common ground might be 
constructed in the interaction of the group as a whole. It is 
possible that shared knowledge can sometimes be explained in 
one way, sometimes another. At any rate, it seems that the 
question of the source of shared knowledge might best be 
treated as an empirical question. 
At Drexel University, we are undertaking a research project to 
investigate empirically whether knowledge sharing in 
community contexts can construct group knowledge that 
exceeds the individual knowledge of the group’s members. Our 
hypothesis is that precisely such a result is, in fact, the hallmark 
of collaborative learning, understood in an emphatic, visionary 
sense. 
We are investigating not only whether computer-supported 
collaborative learning can construct novel group knowledge, but 
what community contexts are favorable to fostering such an 
outcome. We will do this by designing and implementing an 
experimental service in the Math Forum @ Drexel 
(www.mathforum.org), a popular online site with resources and 
problems related to K-12 school mathematics. Students visiting 
the site will be invited to join small virtual teams to discuss and 
solve math problems collaboratively online. We will analyze the 
interactions in these teams to determine how they build shared 
knowledge within the Math Forum virtual community.  
2. A Conflict of Paradigms 
Our work is motivated by the following circumstance: Research 
on learning and education is troubled to its core by a conflict of 
paradigms. Sfard [30] reviewed some of the history and 
consequences of this conflict in terms of the incompatibility of 
the acquisition metaphor (AM) of learning and the participation 
metaphor (PM). AM conceives of education as a transfer of 
knowledge commodities and their subsequent possession by 
individual minds. Accordingly, empirical research in this 
paradigm looks for evidence of learning in changes of mental 
contents of individual learners. PM, in contrast, locates learning 
in intersubjective, social or group processes, and views the 
learning of individuals in terms of their changing participation 
in the group interactions. AM and PM are as different as day 
and night, but Sfard argues that we must learn to live in both 
complementary metaphors. 
The conflict is particularly pointed in the field of CSCL 
(computer-supported collaborative learning). The term 
“collaborative learning” can itself be seen as self-contradictory 
given the tendency to construe learning as taking place in 
individual minds. Having emerged from a series of paradigm 
shifts in thinking about instructional technology [17], the field 
of CSCL is still enmeshed in the paradigm conflict between 
opposed cognitive and sociocultural focuses on the individual 
and the group [16]. In a keynote at the CSCL ’02 conference, 
Koschmann argued that even exemplary instances of CSCL 
research tend to adopt a theoretical framework that is anathema 
to collaboration [18]. Koschmann recommended that talk about 
“knowledge” as a thing that can be acquired should be replaced 
with discussion of “meaning-making in the context of joint 
activity” in order to avoid misleading images of learning as 
mental acquisition and possession.  
Although Koschmann’s alternative phrase can describe the 
intersubjective construction of shared meanings achieved 
through group interaction, the influence of AM can re-construe 
meaning-making as something that must perforce take place in 
individual human minds, because it is hard for most people to 
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see how a group can possess mental contents. In a paper at 
CSCL ’03 responding to Koschmann’s earlier keynote, [37] 
argued that both Koschmann’s language and that of the 
researchers he critiqued is ambiguous and is subject to 
interpretation under either AM or PM. A simple substitution of 
wording is inadequate; it is necessary to make explicit when one 
is referring to individual subjective understanding and when one 
is referring to group intersubjective understanding – and to 
make clear to those under the sway of AM how intersubjectivity 
is concretely possible. 
The problem with recommending that researchers view learning 
under both AM and PM or that they be consistent in their 
theoretical framing is that our common sense metaphors and 
widespread folk theories are so subtly entrenched in our 
thinking and speaking. The languages of Western science reflect 
deep-seated assumptions that go back to the ideas of Plato’s 
Meno and the ego cogito of Descartes’ Meditations. It is hard 
for most people to imagine how a group can have knowledge, 
because we assume that knowledge is a substance that only 
minds can acquire or possess, and that only physically distinct 
individuals can have minds (somewhere in their physical heads). 
3. Evidence to Overcome the Conflict 
We are addressing this central research issue head-on by 
studying online collaborative learning in the specific context of 
Math Forum problems, with the aim of presenting empirical 
examples of concrete situations in which groups can be seen to 
have knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge of the group 
members. By analyzing these situations in detail, we will 
uncover mechanisms by which understanding of mathematics 
passes back and forth between the group as the unit of analysis 
and individual group members as units of analysis.  
One example might be a group of 5 high school students 
collaborating online over a two week period. They solve an 
involved algebra problem and submit a discussion of their 
solution to the Math Forum. By looking carefully at the 
computer logs of their interactions in which they collaboratively 
discussed, solved and reflected upon the problem, we can see 
that the group solution exceeds the knowledge of any individual 
group members before, during or after the collaboration. For 
instance, there may be some arguments that arose in group 
interaction that none of the students fully understood but that 
contributed to the solution. Or a mathematical derivation might 
be too complicated for any of the students to keep “in mind” 
without reviewing preserved chat archives or using an external 
representation the group developed in an online whiteboard. By 
following the contributions of one member at a time, it may also 
be possible to find evidence of what each student understood 
before, during and after the collaboration, and thereby to follow 
individual trajectories of participation in which group and 
individual understandings influenced each other, 
While we do not anticipate that group knowledge often exceeds 
that of all group members under generally prevailing conditions, 
we hypothesize that it can do so at least occasionally under 
particularly favorable conditions. We believe that we can set up 
naturalistic conditions as part of a Math Forum service and can 
collect sufficient relevant data to demonstrate this phenomenon 
in multiple cases. The analysis and presentation of these cases 
should help to overcome the AM/PM paradigm conflict by 
providing concrete illustrations of how knowledge can be built 
through group participation as distinct from – but intertwined 
with – individual acquisition of part of that knowledge. It should 
also help to clarify the theoretical framing of acts of meaning-
making in the context of joint activity. 
We believe that the theoretical confusion surrounding the 
possibility of group knowledge presents an enormous practical 
barrier to collaborative learning. Because students and teachers 
believe that learning is necessarily an individual matter, they 
find the effort at collaborative learning to be an unproductive 
nuisance. For researchers, too, the misunderstanding of 
collaborative learning distorts their conclusions, leading them to 
look for effects of pedagogical and technological innovation in 
the wrong places. If these people understood that groups can 
construct knowledge in ways that significantly exceed the sum 
of the individual contributions and that the power of group 
learning can feed back into individual learning, then we might 
start to see the real potential of collaborative learning realized 
on a broader scale. This project aims to produce rigorous and 
persuasive empirical examples of collaborative learning to help 
bring about the necessary public shift in thinking. 
4. The Range of Views on this Issue 
CSCL grows out of research on cooperative learning that 
demonstrated the advantages for individual learning of working 
in groups [e.g., 14]. There is still considerable ambiguity or 
conflict about how the learning that takes place in contexts of 
joint activity should be conceptualized. While it has recently 
been argued that the key issues arise from ontological and 
epistemological commitments deriving from philosophy from 
Descartes to Hegel [19; 24], we believe that it is more a matter 
of focus on the individual (cognitivist) versus group 
(sociocultural) as the unit of analysis [36; 37]. Positions on the 
issue of the unit of learning take on values along a continuous 
spectrum from individual to group: 
• Learning is always accomplished by individuals, but this 
individual learning can be assisted in settings of 
collaboration, where individuals can learn from each other. 
• Learning is always accomplished by individuals, but 
individuals can learn in different ways in settings of 
collaboration, including learning how to collaborate. 
• Groups can also learn, and they do so in different ways 
from individuals, but the knowledge generated must always 
be located in individual minds. 
• Groups can construct knowledge that no one individual 
could have constructed alone by a synergistic effect that 
merges ideas from different individual perspectives. 
• Groups construct knowledge that may not be in any 
individual minds, but may be interactively achieved in 
group discourse and may persist in physical or symbolic 
artifacts such as group jargon or texts or drawings. 
• Group knowledge can be spread across people and 
artifacts; it is not reducible to the knowledge of any 
individual or the sum of individuals’ knowledge. 
• All human learning is fundamentally social or 
collaborative; language is never private; meaning is 
intersubjective; knowledge is situated in culture and 
history. 
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• Individual learning takes place by internalizing or 
externalizing knowledge that was already constructed inter-
personally; even modes of individual thought have been 
internalized from communicative interactions with other 
people. 
• Learning is always a mix of individual & group processes; 
the analysis of learning should be done with both the 
individual and group as units of analysis and with 
consideration of the interplay between them. 
In this project, we take a rather strong position on collaborative 
learning as our working hypothesis: 
• H0 (collaborative learning hypothesis): A small online 
group of learners can (on occasion and under favorable 
conditions) build knowledge and understanding that 
exceeds that of its individual members.  
The different positions listed above are supported by a 
corresponding range of theories of human learning. Educational 
research on small group process in the 1950’s and ‘60’s 
maintained a focus on the individual as learner [14; 33]. 
Classical cognitive science in the next period continued to view 
human cognition as primarily an individual matter – internal 
symbol manipulation or computation across mental 
representations, with group effects treated as secondary 
boundary constraints [31; 41]. In reaction to these views, a 
number of sociocultural theories have become prominent in the 
learning sciences in recent decades. To a large extent, these 
theories have origins in much older works that conceptualized 
the situated-ness of people in practical activity within a shared 
world [1; 9; 11; 21; 29; 42]. Here are some representative 
theories that focus on the group as a possible unit of knowledge 
construction: 
• Collaborative Knowledge Building. A group can build 
knowledge that cannot be attributed to an individual or to a 
combination of individual contributions [3; 28]. 
• Social Psychology. One can and should study knowledge 
construction at both the individual and group unit of 
analysis, as well as studying the interactions between them 
[7; 26]. 
• Distributed Cognition. Knowledge can be spread across a 
group of people and the tools that they use to solve a 
problem [12; 13; 32]. 
• Situated Cognition. Knowledge often consists of resources 
for practical activity in the world more than of rational 
propositions or mental representations [25; 40; 43]. 
• Situated Learning. Learning is the changing participation 
of people in communities of practice [Lave, 1991 
#31;Chaiklin, 1993 #200;Shumar]. 
• Zone of Proximal Development. Children grow into the 
intellectual life of those around them; they develop in 
collaboration with adults or more capable peers [4; 20; 
42]. 
• Activity Theory. Human understanding is mediated not 
only by physical and symbolic artifacts, but also by the 
social division of labor and cultural practices [6; 22; 23]. 
• Ethnomethodology. Human understanding, inter-personal 
relationships and social structures are achieved and 
reproduced interactionally [5; 8; 10; 38; 39]. 
One does not have to commit to one of these theories in 
particular in order to gain a sense from them of the possible 
nature of group knowledge. We have selected a working 
hypothesis that is in line with these theories in general without 
opting for one specifically. Based on our previous empirical 
work, we believe that we can study the issues raised by these 
theories without circularity by structuring collaborative 
activities, varying their parameters and critically evaluating the 
results. By reflecting on the theoretical issues within our work, 
we believe we can avoid the pitfalls of theory-laden research 
without claiming unattainable value neutrality. 
5. Empirical Study of Group Knowledge 
We previously conducted a pilot study involving a group of five 
middle school students collaborating on a problem involving 
data from a computer simulation. Like many studies of 
collaborative learning (but unlike the new study), this one 
involved face-to-face interaction with an adult mentor present. 
Close analysis of student utterances during an intense 
interaction suggested that the group developed an understanding 
that certainly could not be attributed to the utterances of any one 
student [34]. In fact, the utterances themselves were 
meaningless if taken in isolation from the discourse and its 
activity context.  
There were a number of limitations to the pilot study: (1) 
Although the mentor was quiet for the specific interaction 
analyzed, it might be possible to attribute something of the 
group knowledge to the mentor’s guiding presence. (2) The 
digital videotape was limited in capturing gaze and even some 
wording. (3) The data included only two sessions, too little to 
draw conclusions about how much individual students 
understood of the group knowledge before, during or after the 
interaction. To overcome such limitations, in our current study: 
(1) Mentors are not active in the collaborative groups – although 
the group will work on problems that have been carefully 
crafted to guide student inquiry and advice can be requested by 
email from Math Forum staff. (2) The online communication is 
fully logged, so that researchers have a record of the complete 
problem-solving interaction. (3) Groups will be studied over a 
period of a couple weeks – and longer for several groups that 
work on a sequence of problems. 
Despite its limitations, the pilot study clearly suggests the 
feasibility of studying group knowledge. It shows that group 
knowledge is constructed in discourse and that discourse 
analysis can “make visible” that knowledge to researchers. 
Student discourse is increasingly recognized as of central 
importance to science and math learning [2; 20]. Discourse 
analysis is a rigorous human science, going under various 
names: conversation analysis, interaction analysis, micro-
ethnography, ethnomethodology [8; 10; 15; 27; 39]. 
The focus on discourse suggests a solution to the confusion 
between individual and group knowledge, and to the conceptual 
conflict about how there can be such a thing as group 
knowledge distinct from what is in the minds of individual 
group members [36]. One way of putting it is that meaning is 
constructed in the group discourse. The status of this meaning as 
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shared by the group members is itself something that must be 
continually achieved in the group interaction; frequently the 
shared status “breaks down” and a “repair” is necessary. In the 
pilot study, the interaction of interest centered on precisely such 
a repair of a breakdown in shared understanding among the 
discussants [34]. While meaning inheres in the discourse, the 
individual group members must construct their own 
interpretation of that meaning in an on-going way. Clearly, 
there are intimate relationships between the meanings and their 
interpretations, including the interpretation by one member of 
interpretations of other members. But it is also true that 
language can convey meanings that transcend the 
understandings of the speakers and hearers. It may be precisely 
through divergences among different interpretations or among 
various connotations of meaning that collaboration gains much 
of its creative power [37]. These are questions that we will 
investigate as part of our micro-analytic studies of collaboration 
data, guided by our central working hypothesis. We believe that 
such an approach can maintain a focus on the ultimate potential 
in CSCL, rather than losing sight of the central phenomena of 
collaboration as a result of methods that focus exclusively on 
statistical trends [35].  
6. Related Issues for Investigation 
Collaborative success is hard to achieve and probably 
impossible to predict. CSCL represents a concerted attempt to 
overcome some of the barriers to collaborative success, like the 
difficulty of everyone in a group effectively communicating 
their ideas to all the other members, the complexity of keeping 
track of all the inter-connected ideas that have been offered or 
the barriers to working with people who are geographically 
distant. As appealing as the introduction of technological aids 
for communication, computation and memory seem, they 
inevitably introduce new problems, changing the social 
interactions, tasks and physical environment. Accordingly, 
CSCL study and design must take into careful consideration the 
social composition of groups, the collaborative activities and the 
technological supports. 
In order to observe effective collaboration in an authentic 
educational setting, we are adapting a successful math education 
service to create conditions that will likely be favorable to the 
kind of interactions that we want to study. We must bring 
together groups of people who will work together well, both by 
getting along with and understanding each other and by 
contributing a healthy mix of different skills. We must also 
carefully design mathematics curriculum packages that lend 
themselves to the development and display of deep math 
understanding through collaborative interactions – open-ended 
problems that will not be solved by one individual but that the 
group can chew on for a week or two of online interaction. 
Further, the technology that we provide to our groups must be 
easy to use from the start, while meeting the communicative and 
representational needs of the activities. As part of our project, 
we will study how to accomplish these group formation, 
curriculum design and technology implementation requirements. 
This is expressed in three working hypotheses of the project: 
H1, H2 and H3. Two further working hypotheses define areas of 
knowledge building that the project itself will engage in on the 
basis of our findings. H4 draws conclusions about the interplay 
between group and individual knowledge, mediated by physical 
and symbolic artifacts that embody knowledge in persistent 
forms. H5 reports on the analytic methodology that emerges 
from the project: 
• H1 (collaborative group hypothesis): Small groups are 
most effective at building knowledge if members share 
interests but bring to bear diverse backgrounds and 
perspectives. 
• H2 (collaborative curriculum hypothesis): Educational 
activities can be designed to encourage and structure 
effective collaborative learning by presenting open-ended 
problems requiring shared deep understanding. 
• H3 (collaborative technology hypothesis): Online 
computer support environments can be designed to 
facilitate effective collaborative learning that overcomes 
limitations of face-to-face communication. 
• H4 (collaborative cognition hypothesis): Members of 
collaborative small groups can internalize group 
knowledge as their own individual knowledge and they can 
externalize it in persistent artifacts.  
• H5 (collaborative methodology hypothesis): Quantitative 
and qualitative analysis and interpretation of interaction 
logs can make visible to researchers the online learning of 
small groups and individuals. 
7. References 
[1] Bakhtin, M. (1986) Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, (V. 
McGee, Trans.), University of Texas Press, Austin, TX.  
[2] Bauersfeld, H. (1995) "Language games" in the mathematics 
classroom: Their function and their effects. In P. C. H. Bauersfeld 
(Ed.) The Emergence of Mathematical Meaning: Interaction in 
Classroom Cultures, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 
pp. 271-289.  
[3] Bereiter, C. (2002) Education and Mind in the Knowledge Age, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.  
[4] Brown, A. & Campione, J. (1994) Guided discovery in a 
community of learners. In K. McGilly (Ed.) Classroom Lessons: 
Integrating Cognitive Theory and Classroom Practice, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, pp. 229-270.  
[5] Dourish, P. (2001) Where the Action Is: The Foundations of 
Embodied Interaction, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
[6] Engeström, Y. (1999) Activity theory and individual and social 
transformation. In Y. Engeström, R. Miettinen, & R.-L. Punamäki 
(Eds.), Perspectives on Activity Theory, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 19-38.  
[7] Fischer, K. & Granoo, N. (1995) Beyond one-dimensional change: 
Parallel, concurrent, socially distributed processes in learning and 
development, Human Development, 1995 (38), pp. 302-314.  
[8] Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.  
[9] Heidegger, M. (1927/1996) Being and Time: A Translation of Sein 
und Zeit, (J. Stambaugh, Trans.), SUNY Press, Albany, NY.  
[10] Heritage, J. (1984) Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, UK.  
[11] Husserl, E. (1936/1989) The origin of geometry. (D. Carr, Trans.), 
In J. Derrida (Ed.) Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An 
Introduction, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, pp. 157-
Can community knowledge exceed its members’? 5 Gerry Stahl 
180. (Also in Husserl, E. (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, IL, pp. 353-378.)  
[12] Hutchins, E. (1996) Cognition in the Wild, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA.  
[13] Hutchins, E. & Palen, L. (1998) Constructing meaning from space, 
gesture and speech. In L. B. Resnick, R. Saljo, C. Pontecorvo, & B. 
Burge (Eds.), Discourse, Tools, and Reasoning: Situated Cognition 
and Technologically Supported Environments, Springer Verlag, 
Heidelberg, Germany.  
[14] Johnson, D. W. & Johnson, R. T. (1989) Cooperation and 
Competition: Theory and Research, Interaction Book Company, 
Edina, MN.  
[15] Jordan, B. & Henderson, A. (1995) Interaction analysis: 
Foundations and practice, Journal of the Learning Sciences, 4 (1), 
pp. 39-103. Available at: http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/students/c-
merkel/document4.HTM. 
[16] Kaptelinin, V. & Cole, M. (2002) Individual and collective 
activities in educational computer game playing. In T. Koschmann, 
R. Hall, & N. Miyake (Eds.), CSCL2: Carrying Forward the 
Conversation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 
297-310.  
[17] Koschmann, T. (1996) Paradigm shifts and instructional 
technology. In T. Koschmann (Ed.) CSCL: Theory and Practice of 
an Emerging Paradigm, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 1-
23.  
[18] Koschmann, T. (2002) Dewey's contribution to the foundations of 
CSCL research, In: Proceedings of Computer Support for 
Collaborative Learning (CSCL 2002), Boulder, CO.  
[19] Koschmann, T. (2002) Differing ontologies: Eighteenth-century 
philosophy and the learning sciences, In: Proceedings of 
International Conference of the Learning Sciences (ICLS '02), 
Seattle, WA.  
[20] Lemke, J. (1990) Talking Science, Ablex, Norwood, NJ.  
[21] Marx, K. (1867/1976) Capital, Volume I, (B. Fowkes, Trans.), 
Vintage, New York, NY.  
[22] Nardi, B. (1996) Activity Theory and Human-Computer 
Interaction. In B. Nardi (Ed.) Context and Consciousness: Activity 
Theory and Human-Computer Interaction, MIT Press, pp. 7-15.  
[23] Nardi, B. (Ed.) (1996) Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory 
and Human-Computer Interaction, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
[24] Packer, M. & Goicoechea, J. (2000) Sociocultural and 
constructivist theories of learning: Ontology, not just 
epistemology, Educational Psychologist, 35 (4), pp. 227-241.  
[25] Polanyi, M. (1966) The Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, Garden City, 
NY.  
[26] Resnick, L., Levine, J., & Teasley, S. (Eds.) (1991) Perspectives 
on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological 
Association, Washington, DC.  
[27] Sacks, H. (1992) Lectures on Conversation, Blackwell, Oxford, 
UK.  
[28] Scardamalia, M. & Bereiter, C. (1996) Computer support for 
knowledge-building communities. In T. Koschmann (Ed.) CSCL: 
Theory and Practice of an Emerging Paradigm, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 249-268.  
[29] Schutz, A. (1967) Phenomenology of the Social World, (F. 
Lehnert, Trans.), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL.  
[30] Sfard, A. (1998) On two metaphors for learning and the dangers of 
choosing just one, Educational Researcher, 27 (2), pp. 4-13.  
[31] Simon, H. (1981) The Sciences of the Artificial, (2nd ed.), MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA.  
[32] Solomon, G. (1993) Distributed Cognitions: Psychological and 
Educational Considerations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK.  
[33] Stahl, G. (2000) Review of "Professional Development for 
Cooperative Learning: Issues and Approaches" [book review], 
Teaching and Learning in Medicine: An International Journal, 12 
(4). Available at: 
http://www.cis.drexel.edu/faculty/gerry/cscl/papers/ch18.pdf. 
[34] Stahl, G. (2002) The complexity of a collaborative interaction 
[poster], In: Proceedings of International Conference of the 
Learning Sciences (ICLS '02), Seattle, WA. Available at: 
http://www.cis.drexel.edu/faculty/gerry/cscl/papers/ch02.pdf. 
[35] Stahl, G. (2002) Rediscovering CSCL. In T. Koschmann, R. Hall, 
& N. Miyake (Eds.), CSCL 2: Carrying Forward the Conversation, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 169-181. 
Available at: 
http://www.cis.drexel.edu/faculty/gerry/cscl/papers/ch01.pdf. 
[36] Stahl, G. (2003) Building collaborative knowing: Elements of a 
social theory of learning. In R. Martens (Ed.) What We Know 
about CSCL in Higher Education, Kluwer, Amsterdam, NL. 
Available at: 
http://www.cis.drexel.edu/faculty/gerry/cscl/papers/ch16.htm. 
[37] Stahl, G. (2003) Meaning and interpretation in collaboration. In B. 
Wasson, S. Ludvigsen, & U. Hoppe (Eds.), Designing for Change 
in Networked Learning Environments: Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Computer Support for Collaborative 
Learning (CSCL '03), Kluwer Publishers, Bergen, Norway, pp. 
523-532. Available at: 
http://www.cis.drexel.edu/faculty/gerry/cscl/papers/ch20.pdf. 
[38] Streeck, J. (1996) How to do things with things, Human Studies, 
19, pp. 365-384.  
[39] Streeck, J. & Mehus, S. (2003) Microethnography: The study of 
practices. In K. F. R. Sanders (Ed.) Handbook of Language and 
Social Interaction, Erlbaum Associates, Mahway, NJ.  
[40] Suchman, L. (1987) Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of 
Human-Machine Communication, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK.  
[41] Vera, J. & Simon, H. (1993) Situated action: A symbolic 
interpretation, Cognitive Science, 17 (1), pp. 7-48.  
[42] Vygotsky, L. (1930/1978) Mind in Society, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA.  
[43] Winograd, T. & Flores, F. (1986) Understanding Computers and 
Cognition: A New Foundation of Design, Addison-Wesley, 
Reading, MA.  
 
